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This article is the first examination of pension reform in China and its
effects on different social groups over the past three decades. China's
pension system has undergone radical transition from the state‐
employer model to a state‐society one based on the combination of
an underlying aim of supporting the economic reforms and learning
from international experience. Although the pension system has
expanded over the past three decades and the majority of people
are now covered by social pensions, this remarkable policy change
has created new inequalities. First, an important aspect of social strat-
ification has been reshaped into five distinct pension scheme classes.
Second, the new pension model has strengthened the link between
benefits and contributions, which privileges the better off. In this
newly stratified pension system, those with high human capital and
family capital, and who are in the more developed regions are the
clear winners. To tackle these inequalities, future pension reform in
China should focus on promoting equalization and de‐stratification.
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While social and economic reform in China has been characterized by gradualism, the pension system has been rad-
ically reshaped over the past 30 years, from traditional state‐employer security to state‐society security and, remark-
ably, pensions have been extended to the majority of people. Pension system development has accompanied the
domestic economic and enterprise reforms as well as being part of global social welfare developments. The resulting
complex pension regime has significant effects on social stratification such as poverty elimination, income equality,
and social integration. The main purpose of this article is to examine the distributional effects of China's new pension
system on different population subgroups. In other words, who gets what pensions and why? First, we provide the- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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2 ZHU AND WALKERbackground to pension reform in China. Second, we summarize relevant research on social stratification and social
welfare and pensions. Third, we assess empirically the stratification effects of pensions by using the 2013 Chinese
Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) longitudinal data‐set from the perspectives of the individual,
family, and macro socioeconomic circumstances. The final part of the article considers the possible future direction
of pension policy in China to promote greater equality and social integration.2 | PENSION REFORM IN CHINA
China had established an employer‐based Soviet style pension system as early as 1950. This was characterized by
employer contributions, government management, pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG), a single tier and closed operation (Zheng,
2008). As the problems with this model became apparent, it was radically changed to state‐social security in the
context of economic reform and global pension system reform.
First, the economic system reform, from a planned economy tomarket‐oriented one, centered on state‐owned enter-
prises (SOEs) and eroded the foundations of the original pension system. One of the aims of SOE reformwas to separate
them from government, as independent business entities, like private enterprises, in order to improve economic efficiency
and competiveness (Zhou, 1998). Reducing the size ofworkforces, especially workers aged 40 and over, was viewed as an
important dimension of improving efficiency. A lifelong dependent relationship between workers and their enterprises
was replaced by a contractual one, which meant the loss of all of the welfare programs provided by enterprises before
the reform. SOE reform, in the name of efficiency, resulted inmillions ofworkers being laid‐off. For example, 32.39million
workers lost their jobs because of SOE reforms between 1997 and 1998 alone (Wang, 2007).
Second, inherentproblemswithin the traditional pension systemwasanother vital factor driving this paradigmatic change.
For example, the state‐employer model consisting of non‐contributory pensions financed solely by enterprises was deemed
unsustainable in anageing society; and fundspooledat theenterprise level restricts labormobility (Zheng, 2000). Thosepeople
who had retired before the reformhad no pension to live on andmany of their childrenwere unable to support thembecause
of unemployment.Meanwhile, thosewho remained economically active lost the expectation of socioeconomic securitywhen
they retired. Thus it was urgent to establish a new pension system independent from SOEs to support the retired.
Third, pension system reform in China followed economic reform and was part of the global trend of pension sys-
tem reform (World Bank, 1994). The first wave of neoliberalism in the West, in the late 1970s and 1980s, advocated
privatization, marketization, and free trade (Walker, 1990). Welfare state retrenchment followed, especially of state‐
run social insurance pension systems, on the pretext of a welfare state crisis (Walker, 1991; Walker & Deacon, 2003).
The leading neoliberal economist, Milton Friedman visited China three times, in 1980, 1988, and 1993. Three other
foreign experts from the United States, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and Singapore visited China in
1989 to recommend pension reform (Salditt, Whiteford, & Adema, 2008; Whiteford, 2003). At the same time, the
now crisis‐hit Chilean pension reform was proselytized by international governmental organizations (IGOs) and influ-
enced many Latin America countries, and the World Bank purveyed a multi‐pillar pension system (Holzmann, 2013).
These international developments affected the path selection of pension reform in China at a time when a pension
system was urgently needed to maintain economic growth, social stability, and political authority (Croll, 1999), but
when domestic policymakers and experts had no idea about what was the best system for China to adopt.
A mixed pension system was designed for workers in urban areas and confirmed by regulations in 1995. The new
pension system, Enterprise Employee Basic Pension (EEBP), was based on the “social pooling combined with individ-
ual account” model, which combined PAYG and fully‐funded principles. According to the regulations issued in 2005, a
retired worker would receive two distinct pensions. One was from the social pooling account, which was the accumu-
lation of employer contributions, where the benefit levels depended on the average wage of workers, the worker's
salary before retiring, and the number of contribution years. The second pension was from the individual account,
which was accumulated from individual contributions before retirement. The new pension model was not simply
“policy emulation”, but “policy learning” (Hu, 2012). Its prototypes included the ILO social insurance model based
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Chilean model (Hu, 2012). Moreover, the 1995 pension regulations proposed two implementation plans which also
indicated deliberate comparison and selection, as well as confusion among policymakers. After the establishment of
the new model, subsequent pension system reforms focused on extending its coverage and adapting it to China's
particular socioeconomic and cultural environment. The pension system was extended to all types of enterprise
employees in 1997 and further to all workers including the self‐employed in urban areas in 2005, which was approx-
imately 235.5 million people or 21.5% of the total population aged 16 and over in 2009. However, the majority of the
population was excluded from this reform tide, and only some of them were covered by entirely different pension
systems such as those for government and civil servants (gongwuyuan).
Those living in rural areas, in urban areas without jobs, housewives, overwhelmingly women, and rural migrant
workers, were excluded from the social protection net until 2009, although the government had attempted to estab-
lish a pension system for rural residents in 1992, which ended in failure because of the lack of financial support (Ding,
2011). The structure of the Urban‐Rural Resident Social Pension (URRSP) covering rural residents and urban residents
excluded from other pension systems is similar to the EEBP with a basic account and an individual account. However,
the basic account in the URRSP is not accumulated by employers' contributions, but financed by central and local gov-
ernments. The benefit level is equal for all beneficiaries regardless of individual income or contributions, but there are
huge discrepancies among regions as a result of wide variations in local economic development. Moreover, the indi-
vidual account is composed of personal contributions and local government subsidy and therefore is also a source of
inequality between regions. Up to the end of 2016, more than 510 million people were covered by the URRSP, and
150 million of these were aged 60 and over who were receiving pensions. For government and civil servants, a special
pension system was established in 1950 which was non‐contributory as well as providing relatively high benefit levels,
and remained unchanged until 2015 (Zheng, Sun, & Qi, 2009). Under the huge societal pressure that mounted over
the extreme inequality in pensions between different social groups, a regulation regarding government and institution
pensions (GIP) was issued in 2015, the model for which is the same as for the EEBP Scheme. Although the character-
istics of the GIP and the EEBP are similar, the two systems have not been merged. Thus there are three types of
national state pensions in China: the GIP, the EEBP, and the URRSP.
In sum, from 1991 to 2015, China undertook a historic transition in its pension system from the state‐employer
model to a state‐society one and gave everyone a chance to take part, even though full coverage was not achieved.
However, there were many inevitable problems when completing this mammoth task in such a short time period. The
pension system is a mixed product based on diverse models and, therefore, entails some of the disadvantages of each
model, as well as attempting to combine different principles. For example, the World Bank stresses individual respon-
sibility, economic efficiency, and growth, which is the same as Singapore's CPF, but those are very different from the
ILO model, which emphasizes state responsibility, social equality, and political stability (Hu, 2012), as well as the
preservation of traditional status differences in society (Scruggs & Allan, 2008). Today, the three parallel state pension
systems cover different subgroups mainly separated according to type of employment. In addition, diversities among
provinces, urban and rural areas, and socio‐economic classes also contribute to pension inequality and wider social
stratification.3 | SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND THE WELFARE STATE
Social stratification has long been one of the important themes of welfare state research. On the one hand, neo‐
Marxists regarded the social welfare provided by advanced welfare states as a tool for easing class contradictions
and maintaining social stability (O'Connor, 1973; Offe, 1972; Piven, 1993); on the other hand, citizenship theorists
(Marshall, 1992; Parkin, 1979) saw welfare reforms as a major contribution to the declining salience of class. Both
schools agreed that social welfare policies contributed to equality, stability, and solidarity among classes regardless
of the original aims of those policies (Weale, 1990). Some empirical research demonstrated a positive effect of
4 ZHU AND WALKERpensions on reducing income gaps (Caminada & Goudswaard, 2005; Kenworthy & Pontusson, 2005; Mahler & Jesuit,
2006). Wang & Caminada (2011) compared the impact of 36 Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Develop-
ment countries' social transfers and taxes on inequality, and found that the former contributed the lion's share of 85%
in total income inequality reduction, while the latter accounted for only 15%. Furthermore, in terms of social transfers,
pensions accounted for 46% of total redistribution followed by disability benefits (9%) and social assistance (7%),
while sickness benefits accounted for only 2%. On average, developed countries are less unequal than other regions
of the world (Lustig, 2015). The Gini coefficient for the advanced economies was between 0.2 and 0.3 in 2014 with
the exceptions of the United Kingdom and the United States, while the Gini coefficient in most less developed coun-
tries such as Chile, Turkey, and Mexico was over 0.4. Relatively low inequality is the result of fiscal redistribution on a
large scale. For example, the Gini coefficient inTurkey was 0.495 in 2013 before social transfers and 0.421 when the
social transfers were taken into account. The equivalent figures in Sweden were 0.534 and 0.249, respectively.
Although welfare reforms have routinely been launched in the name of equality, the core aim of all welfare states
is social protection and income maintenance, not reshaping the class structure (Esping‐Andersen, 2015). However,
while the welfare state provides services and income security, it is also and always has been, a system of social
stratification. Welfare states are key institutions in the structuring of the class and the social order (Crompton,
2008; Taylor‐Gooby, 2016). The organizational features of the welfare state help to determine the articulation of
social solidarity, divisions of class, and status differentiation (Esping‐Andersen, 1990). In general, as noted above,
developed countries have been more equal than less developed countries (Bratberg, Anti Nilsen, & Vaage, 2005;
Holzer, 2007; Jæger & Holm, 2007) although there is huge variation among both groups of countries. The equalizing
achievements of welfare states are, primarily the consequence of family policies aimed at evening out conditions for
children during their formative years (Beller & Hout, 2006; Shaefer & Ybarra, 2012; Sørensen, 2006) as well as labor
market policies promoting female emancipation (Esping‐Andersen, 2015). In less developed countries, however,
informal security regimes and insecurity regimes result in problematic inclusion or adverse incorporation, in which
the government cannot play even vestigial governance and security enhancing roles, which means that people rely
heavily on community and family (Wood & Gough, 2006).
The literature on the welfare state demonstrates that state institutions, structures, and policies are both the cause
and consequence of social inequality. Welfare policies in conservative welfare regimes tend to have as a primary goal
the preservation of traditional status differences in society and so are likely to reinforce the existing social order.
Classical liberalism often manifested itself in programs that encouraged more extensive interaction with the market
for the purposes of income maintenance and insurance against risks posed by illness and especially old age. Social
democratic welfare regimes emphasized universalism in a broad sense—across class lines—linking state policies to
social citizenship (Esping‐Andersen, 1990; Scruggs & Allan, 2008). As well as political‐ideological influences, the var-
iation of redistribution effects across welfare states derived from the so‐called “paradox of redistribution”: the more
that benefits are targeted at the poor only, as opposed to creating equality via equal public transfers to all, the less
likely they are to reduce poverty and inequality (Korpi & Palme, 1998). The targeting model creates a zero‐sum con-
flict of interest between the poor and the middle class, while the encompassing model includes all citizens in the same
program, which benefits not only the manual workers and the better‐off citizens, but the poor as well (Hirschman,
1970; Korpi & Palme, 1998). However, the outcomes of different welfare state systems have become blurred recently.
Inequality has been increasing steadily in both encompassing and continental models (Alves, 2015).
As a cornerstone of the welfare state, pension systems undoubtedly deeply affect levels of poverty, inequality,
and the nature of social stratification (Naegele & Walker, 2007). A well‐designed national pension system should
aim at mitigating the risk of poverty in old age, securing an adequate pension income, achieving inter‐generational
and intra‐generational solidarity and equity through the redistribution of income, and achieving cost efficiency
through the reduction of adverse labor market incentives (Brown, 2008; Stavrakis, 2012). In practice, inequality in
pensions is prevalent in many countries, and pension system development is a stratified process (Walker & Foster,
2006). In most countries the better‐off groups such as civil servants were covered first and by superior pensions. In
the private sector formal pension entitlements tended to develop first in the largest and most bureaucratic firms. Even
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which are institutionalized in labor market and employment status and the domestic division of labor, is reflected in
relative disadvantage in retirement (Titmuss, 1955; Walker, 1980). Older people have become more of a distinct social
category, defined by age, gender, class, and marital status in relation to the welfare system, as opposed to physical
condition and capacity to contribute to economic and social change (Foster & Walker, 2006). Women who commonly
have part‐time jobs, low salaries, casual or temporary employment, and work in small organizations are at a disadvan-
tage in pension systems due mainly to the prerequisite of continuous contributions (Foster, 2014; Ginn, Street, &
Arber, 2001). Pension policies occupying a residual role in liberal welfare states, such as the United Kingdom, aim
at preventing the poorest from poverty by providing low level benefits, which creates “two nations” in old age: those
with decent jobs before retirement with supplementation by occupational pensions, and the majority of older people
who are reliant on national insurance pensions (Titmuss, 1955; Walker, 1981) or between salaried and manual classes
(Hannah, 1986).4 | DATA AND METHODS
4.1 | Data sources
The data are from the 2013 wave of the CHARLS, which is conducted by the National School of Development, Peking
University. The CHARLS began in 2011 and has subsequently re‐interviewed every two years. The survey aims at
collecting high quality micro‐level individual information for research, and includes almost all aspects of individuals
aged 45 and over and their families, such as health status, health care and insurance, work, retirement, pension,
income assets, and housing. Compared with other relevant surveys, the CHARLS is the most appropriate data‐set
for our purposes. First of all, it is the most comprehensive data referring to the pension theme available in China.
All of the interviewees must be asked about their pension scheme, benefit levels, contributions, when they started
receiving a pension, reasons for being without pensions, jobs before retirement, and so on. Second, the CHARLS col-
lects individual as well as family information, which enables an exploration of the effects of family status on pensions.
Third, the CHARLS is a highly representative data‐set, which covers 450 villages and communities out of 28 provinces
and interviewed 23,000 people up to 2015. The 2013 second wave collected information on 18,378 people, including
15,637 interviewees who took part in 2011 and 2,741 new recruits.4.2 | Measures
Compared with the first wave, data from the second wave, used in our analyses, specify the pension structure in
detail. This can be divided into three parts: one is the so‐called social pension organized by the government, another
is the commercial pension provided by insurance companies, and the last is the occupational pension from employers.
In stark contrast to most developed countries, the commercial and occupational pensions cover only a tiny minority,
although central and local governments declare their desire to promote them. According to this survey, in 2013, only
36 interviewees had joined an occupational pension, accounting for less than 0.2% of the total sample, and 531 inter-
viewees were in commercial pension schemes, consisting of 3% of the total sample.
Thus we put the main emphasis on the social pension, which is then further divided into at least eight types. In
addition to arrangements for different subgroups, the differences between the social pension systems also derive
from national policy experimentation. For example, the rural pension, also called the old rural pension, was established
in 1992 and was replaced by the New Rural Social Pension (NRSP) in 2009, but some retired people also continued to
receive the rural pension. Meanwhile, although the Urban Resident Social Pension (URSP) and the NRSP were merged
at the policy level of central government in 2014, these two systems were still operating in parallel when the survey
was conducted in 2013. Therefore, we merged the old rural pension, land‐losing farmers' pension, the URSP, and the
NRSP into the URRSP as a single item. There are two other pensions: the GIP and the EEBP. As a kind of non‐
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mented mainly by municipal governments and covered only 18 provinces or 21 cites consisting of 1.56 million older
people at the end of 2013 (Zhu, 2015). Considering its low coverage and benefit level, the AAA is excluded from the
above social pension composite variable and analyzed separately. In all, out of 11,327 interviewees, 64% were in the
URRSP; 1,996 interviewees, 11%, were in the EEBP; 5.6% of interviewees were members of the GIP, and almost 20%
were excluded from any pension scheme.
Everybody is embedded within multiple socioeconomic circumstances, and therefore a particular person's
pension is determined by many factors at both micro and macro levels. Of those, individual characteristics, family
background, and macro socioeconomic circumstances and social policy are the key factors. First of all, individual char-
acteristics are divided into demographic features and human capital. The former, including gender, age, and marital
status are immune to social interventions. The latter involving education, residential (hukou) status, hukou mobility,
and occupational mobility is easily affected by other factors. Second, we employed parental education and occupation
to measure family background, while macro factors are gauged at the provincial level by the urban–rural income ratio,
gross domestic product (GDP) per person, the urbanization rate, old age dependency ratio, the percentage receiving
pensions at aged 60 and over, and the percentage of social security expenditure to total public expenditure. Table 1
shows the variables and sample distribution.
4.3 | Methods
We examine the stratification effects of pensions from the perspectives of individual, family and province. The indi-
vidual and family are nested within a province and constitute a two‐level structure. Thus the Hierarchical Linear
Model (HLM) was the most suitable analytical method. Its main advantage is analyzing variance in the outcome vari-
ables when the predictor variables are at varying hierarchical levels (Heather, Andrea, Mackay, & Meredith, 2012).
Compared with traditional ordinary least squares, HLM accounts for the shared variance in hierarchically structured
data (Hofmann, 1997).
A two‐level model consists of two submodels at level ‐1 and level ‐2. The variables in level ‐1 include demo-
graphic characteristics, human capital and family background, formulated as follows:
Ypension ¼ β0j þ β1jXgender;ij þ β2jXage;ij þ ···þ β q−1ð ÞjXparental education;ij þ βqjXparental occupation;ij þ Υ ij (1)
Where βqj are level‐1 coefficients, and Υij is the level‐1 random effect.
There are 6 variables at the provincial level including urban‐rural income ratio, GDP per person, urbanization rate,
old age dependency ratio and so on. Each of the level‐1 coefficients, βqj, becomes an outcome variable in level‐2:
βqj ¼ Υq0 þ Υq1Wurban–rural income ration; j þ ···þ ΥqsWurbanization rate; j þ μqj (2)
Where Υqs are level‐2 coefficients, and μqj is a level‐2 random effect.5 | RESULTS
5.1 | The stratified pension system
China's great era of pension policy reform since the 1980s has served economic goals rather than social ones such as
equality and social integration. A highly stratified pension system was created by a combination of historical and con-
temporary policy factors. The 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (NCCPC) in 2012 said that the
country should institute a complete, multi‐tiered and sustainable system to provide basic security for both the urban
and rural populations, with an emphasis on making the system more equitable and sustainable, and ensuring the
smooth transfer of social security accounts between localities. Four key terms provide the guiding principles for
TABLE 1 Variables and sample distribution (n = 18,378)
Variables Values N %
Individual characters Gender Male 8,762 47.7
Female 9,616 52.3
Age 59 and under 9,540 51.9
60–79 8,033 43.7
80+ 805 4.4
Marital status Married 15,964 86.9
Others 2,413 13.1
Human capital Hukou status Rural 11,960 79.7
Urban 3,053 20.3
Education Elementary school 10,159 67.7
Middle and high school 4,544 30.3
Collage and upper 309 2.0
Hukou mobility Urban–rural 144 1.0
No change 12,990 86.6
Rural–urban 1,864 12.4
First job type Farmer 13,404 77.0
Self‐employer 674 3.9
Enterprise employee 2,023 11.6
Public worker 915 5.3
Civil servant 397 2.3
Occupational mobilitya Downward 1,153 8.0
Non‐mobility 11,487 79.5
Upward 1,814 12.6
Indexed salary before retirementb,c 41.5
Family capital Parental education Elementary school 9,606 92.8
Middle and high school 652 6.3
Collage and upper 95 0.9
Parental occupation Famer, fisher, etc. 7,765 76.3
Commercial worker 303 3.0
Clerk 311 3.1
Production worker 514 5.1
Professional workers 480 4.7
Governmental leader 803 7.9
Macro circumstancesc
(demographic, economic,
social policy)
Urban–rural income ratio 2.8
Ln (GDP per person) 10.7
Urbanization rate 55.7
Old age dependent ratio 12.8
Percentage of beneficiaries 124.5
Percentage of financial expenditure 11.8
Notes.
aOccupational mobility is equal to the last job type minus the first job type, the values of which range from ‐4 to 4. In order to
express this simply, the values from ‐4 to ‐1 are classified downwards, and the values from 1 to 4 are classified upwards, the
zero means non‐mobility.
bConsidering salary comparability for different years, we calculate the indexed salary by dividing the real salary by social aver-
age salary in the same year.
cThose continuous variables such as indexed salary and macro circumstance are displayed with the mean values.
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the stratification effects of the new pension system.
First, the principle of full coverage aims at eliminating people's worries about the future and protecting them from
poverty when they retire, which definitely should be major functions of a pension. According to the 2013 survey the
coverage rate had almost doubled from 44.57%, compared to the same survey in 2011. This massive achievement is
attributable to the operation of the URRSP, which provided an unconditional pension to those aged 60 and over when
the policy was implemented, even if they had not contributed. Those aged between 46 and 59 were entitled to
choose a single premium and receive pensions when reaching 60 years of age. For example, supposing that a person
was aged 58 when the pension policy was implemented in 2010, he or she would be entitled to a pension two years
TABLE 2 Indicators of pension inequality (n = 6,991)
Overall GIP EEBP URRSP
Average (CNY per month) 708.4 2543.44 1813.84 127.47
SD 1045.05 1246.57 661.74 219.13
CV 1.48 0.49 0.36 1.72
Gini coefficient 0.6815 0.2708 0.1918 0.5033
Note. Deleting the extreme values by 0.5% of the maximum and minimum, respectively. The same below.
8 ZHU AND WALKERlater with the precondition of contributing for only two years. Much research suggests that even a low level pension
generates positive impacts on older people and their families. In addition to direct poverty reduction, a pension also
helps older people to build social capital and strengthens their status in households and communities (Uprety,
2010). For example, older people use pensions to maintain connections and social networks within their communities
by making contributions as socially required towards marriages and funerals (Suwanrada & Wesumperuma, 2012).
Also, pensions play a key role in supporting human capital development, particularly for grandchildren, by contributing
to their education (Duflo, 2003; Samson, 2007).
Second, the principles of basic security and sustainability reflect anxiety about the prospective national financial
burden, which in turn results in inadequate pensions. Thus the remarkably fast expansion of coverage was at the
expense of a decent pension level. Facing the dilemma between coverage and adequacy, the government chose the
former. The replacement rate of the EEBP has fallen since 1995, especially over last decade, even though the govern-
ment has compulsorily improved pension levels at the rate of 10% every year since 2005, 8% in 2016, and 5.5% in
2017. It dropped from over 80% at the beginning of the reform to 44% in 2011 and 42.3% in 2013 (Li & Wang,
2013). This was due to the new pension policy issued in 2005 strengthening the tie between benefits and contribu-
tions, rather than average salaries, which have increased dramatically since the end of 1990s (Li &Wang, 2013; Zhang,
Yang, & Zhang, 2012). Those in the URRSP received only 55 CNY per month, which remained unchanged until 2015
when it increased to 70 CNY per month. According to the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, the aver-
age pension per month of the URRSP was 119 CNY, 5% of the EEBP, in 2015. Its symbolism is much more important
than the actual amount provided.
Third, the multi‐pillar principle further enlarges stratification. Multi‐pillar, on the one hand, means different pen-
sions co‐existing between subgroups; and, on the other hand, it can also mean more than one pension per person. As
demonstrated above, there are at least three essentially different social pension schemes, resulting in huge inequality
among subgroups. As shown inTable 2, there are large gaps between benefit levels among these three schemes. The
average pension for the total population is 708 CNY per month, or 16.5% of the average salary, and the Gini coeffi-
cient is 0.68 indicating extreme inequality. This inequality mainly results from the separated pension schemes. The
ratio of benefit levels is 20:14:1. As shown in Table 3, further decomposition with a Theil index reveals that over
80% of the inequality is explained by the distinct pension schemes, while the rest is rooted within the schemes them-
selves. Although benefits within the URRSP are generally low, individual inequalities within it are more distinct than
those in the other two schemes.TABLE 3 Theil index of pensions (n = 6,991)
T Contribution degree (%)
Pension type Within groups GIP 0.0465 5.20
EEBP 0.0330 3.69
URRSP 0.0878 9.82
Between groups 0.7269 81.29
Note. Deleting the extreme values by 0.5% of the maximum and minimum, respectively.
0 20 40 60 80
Others
Ordinary residents
Employees in pr ivate  
enterprises,  r ich self -
employed,  and residents
Employees in SOEs
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FIGURE 1 China's stratified pension system [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note. The horizontal axis represents the replacement rate of pensions, and the vertical axis represents subgroups.
ZHU AND WALKER 9In addition to those deriving from basic social pensions, inequalities worsen when taking social, occupational and
commercial pensions into consideration. This shows that the adoption of a multi‐pillar approach in China works
against the goal of equality. Occupational pensions are not characterized by universality but are “work‐select”, which
means that only those with relatively stable employment, mainly employees in state‐owned or large‐scale enterprises,
and middle and high earners are entitled to them (Walker, 1981). For example, based on the data set, over 80% of
interviewees reporting receiving occupational pensions were in the EEBP and the GIP. Of those, two‐thirds previously
worked in SOEs and one‐third were civil servants. In contrast, commercial pensions reflect income rather than job
type: 76% of interviewees receiving commercial pensions were farmers and the self‐employed and 17% of them were
enterprise employees. Because of extremely low pensions the better‐off without an occupational pension regard a
commercial pension as a vital additional income source.
Thus, as shown in Figure 1, which, in terms of benefit levels, take the shape of an inverted pyramid (or, in terms of
population coverage, an upright pyramid). At the top are civil servants with the most superior social pensions, a total
of 148 million people (5.6% of all pensioners), although most of them only have a single pension. In 2015 the tax‐
financed pension for civil servants was abolished and replaced by the model of social pooling combined with individual
accounts, but an additional occupation pension was compulsorily established to compensate for the reduced level of
benefits. Below them are employees in SOEs with mid‐upper social pensions and considerable occupational pensions
— 146 million pensioners (5.5%). In the middle of the pyramid are workers in private companies, the self‐employed
and some ordinary residents with relatively high incomes both in urban and rural areas. They use commercial pensions
to supplement low social pensions—204 million pensioners (7.7%). The mid‐lower class is the majority of urban and
rural residents who are only covered by the URRSP and without a commercial pension—1,628 million pensioners
(61.4%). The lowest class are those without any pensions—525 million people (19.8%).5.2 | The winners in the stratified pension system
The strategy of pension reform called “full coverage, basic security, multi‐pillars, and sustainability” has generated dis-
tinct and transformational stratification effects, which exist between as well as within schemes. Therefore, for a cer-
tain individual, how much is received not only depends on which type of pension scheme that person is a member of,
but also on how many contributions the person has made. Those two influences are further determined by complex
factors, such as individual characteristics, especially in terms of gender, family background, and macro socioeconomic
circumstances. In Table 4 we analyze the factors driving pensions from the perspective of individual characteristics,
human and family capital, and provincial socioeconomic circumstances, using HLM across four models.
TABLE 4 Factors determining the pension (n = 6,991)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
One level Individual character Gender (male = 1) ‐263.4*** ‐246.2*** ‐107.4*
Age ‐6.5** 5.2* 14.8***
Marital status (married = 1) ‐156.8*** ‐178.5*** ‐44.0
Family capital Parental education 133.3*** ‐9.6
Parental occupation 136.9*** ‐2.1
Human capital Education 148.1***
Hukou (rural) 1016.3***
Hukou mobility 43.4
First job type 291.3***
Occupational mobility 141.2***
Indexed salary before retirement 0.5***
Two levels Gender (male = 1) ‐113.2***
Age 13.2***
Hukou (rural) 1058.2***
Urbanization rate 10.5*
Education 144.4***
Ln (GDP per person) 118.2***
First job type 255.4***
Ln (GDP per person) 123.9**
Occupational mobility 122.5***
Indexed salary before retirement 0.9***
Urban–rural income ratio 2.1***
Ln (GDP per person) 1.3**
Old age dependency ratio ‐0.1*
Old age dependency ratio ‐80.2***
Percentage of beneficiaries 11.4***
Percentage of financial expenditure ‐62.8***
Notes. Values in brackets are reference groups.
Significant levels:
*p < 0.05,
**p < 0.01,
***p < 0.001.
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ticular, compared with men, women are at a clear disadvantage. Their average pension is 263 CNY per month, or
30% lower than their male counterparts. This gendered outcome is mainly due to both the occupational disadvantages
of women in the labor market at earlier states in their life course and the inadequate compensation made for the
effects of motherhood and other caring activities (Foster & Walker, 2006). Also, the older people are, the lower the
pensions they receive. The pensions of married couples are higher than those of others.
When family capital is added to create Model 2 there are two important outcomes. On the one hand, family cap-
ital has a significant impact on pension levels, which seems to imply that a person's pension is partly determined
before he or she is born. Many studies demonstrate that the family plays a major role in determining the location
of individuals within the social structure. Although family relationships do not in and of themselves create class rela-
tionships, they play a vital role in reproducing them, and the family is the major transmitter of social advantage and
disadvantage (Crompton, 2006), which in turn affects their children's future pensions. On the other hand, the effect
of age is inverted from negative to positive. It is common for people with similar family backgrounds to seek similar
jobs, which results in them participating in the same pension scheme. This means that the pensions are regressive
the later the retirement within the same pension scheme, which results from the reduction of the replacement rate.
Thus, the negative effect of age in Model 1 is likely to result from institutional diversity.
The human capital index consisting of education, hukou, occupation, and so on, was pooled into Model 3. The
most distinct change is the disappearance of the significance of the family capital variables, which indicates that
the impact of family capital on pensions is indirect with the intervention of human capital. In addition to the effects
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children's education, which contributes to their human capital and subsequent pension entitlement. Meanwhile, the
impact of gender on pension reduces, while for age it has the opposite effect. Regarding human capital, all variables
are significant except for hukou mobility. In general, the higher the human capital, the higher the pension level.
Model 4 puts bothmicro andmacro variables into the pool and deletes the non‐significant variables inModel 3 (family
capital, marital status, andhukoumobility). Table 4 shows that individual characteristics, including gender and age, are inde-
pendent fromother variables, and the coefficients are similar to those inModel 3. Regarding human capital, all variables are
affected by macro circumstances except for occupational mobility. First of all, macro economic factors strengthen the
effects of individual human capital on pensions. For example, the macro factor “urbanization rate” enlarges the pension
gaps between rural and urban pensioners, which means that pension inequalities in the developed eastern provinces are
greater than in the less developed middle and western provinces, and it also means that economic development
strengthens the stratification effect of pensionswithin the current policy structure. Similarly, the variable “GDPper person”
generates positive effects on education, first job type and salary before retirement. In contrast, the demographic factor, old
age dependency ratio, has a negative effect on pensions. This is likely to be associatedwith economic development. Due to
labor mobility frommiddle and western provinces to eastern ones, the left‐behind older people result in an increase in the
old age dependency ratio. In terms of social welfare policies, the percentage of beneficiaries has a positive impact on pen-
sions, confirming that positive welfare policies contribute to decent benefits. Although the variable percentage of financial
expenditure generates a significantly negative impact on pensions, it does not negate the previous conclusion, because the
proportion is determined by both expenditure and GDP. Data indicate that the less developed provinces have higher per-
centages of financial expenditure than the more advanced ones, even though the absolute values are lower. In all, socio-
economic factors at the macro level generate significant impacts on inequalities and stratification. Economic factors
favor the better off in developed regions compared to their counterparts in less developed ones, with human capital
playing an intermediate role. Although the percentage of financial expenditure in developed provinces is lower than in less
developed ones, the greater absolute expenditure and coverage increase the pension levels of the former.
5.3 | Who benefits and who loses?
The strategy proposed by the 18th NCCPC aimed at establishing pensions for all in the form of basic security, which
drove the extraordinary extension of pension coverage in China. This increased from 360 million people in 2010 to
858 million people in 2015, representing an average annual increase of 19%. The International Social Security
Association gave the prestigious Award of Outstanding Achievement in Social Security to the Chinese Government
for this unprecedented extension of pensions. The problem of pension stratification, however, remains unresolved.
A key factor in this failure is that the primary purpose of China's pension reforms was not to promote wellbeing for
retirees but, rather, to further its economic reforms. Due to the failure to observe the basic principles of pension
systems, not only have many social problems not been resolved, in practice, but pension policy has created significant
new ones, the most important one of which is a range of new inequalities.
In terms of social pensions, there are four main groups. At the top are those in the GIP, then follows those covered
by the EEBP, the third group are those in the URRSP, and at the bottom are people without any pensions. The multi‐
pillar principle further reinforced pension stratification. Occupational pensions filled the gap in social pensions between
SOE workers and civil servants. At the same time, commercial pensions compensated for the low social pension received
by the better off under the URRSP, even though there remained a large gap between them and SOE workers and civil
servants. When occupational and commercial pensions are taken into account pension system reform has reshaped this
aspect of social stratification into five overall classes. In addition to the traditional division between workers and non‐
workers, a new and crucial line of social division has appeared within what was once a single unified working class
(Westergaard, 1995). Above the new line are “core employees” employed by central and local governments and SOEs;
below the line are those in private companies or with part‐time jobs. Again, women are the most disadvantaged. Also
below the line are China's nearly 300 million migrant workers who remain classified as rural residents and are thus eli-
gible for the URRSP.
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pooling combined with individual accounts, initiated in the EEBP and subsequently in the URRSP and the GIP, created
negative social stratification effects. The relationship between benefit and employment prior to retirement is now
closer than before the reforms. Those with higher occupations and salaries in the reformed system receive higher
pensions than their counterparts in the old one. Second, there are several pension systems for subgroups divided by
job types before retirement. Those pension systems differ from each other in many respects, such as contributions,
management, and benefit formulae, as a result of pension inequality. Although civil servants are under an obligation
to contribute in order to qualify for pensions when they retire and the benefit formula of their social pensions is same
as their counterparts in the EEBP, their privileged position was sustained by the compulsory introduction of a new
occupational pension as compensation for the loss they incurred in accepting the new system. The contribution rates
of these occupational pensions are 8% of salary for employers and 4% for employees. Third, the different adjustment
mechanisms of benefit levels for each pension scheme also fuel inequality. As mentioned above, the benefit level of the
EEBP has been increased since 2005 at the rate of 10%, 8% in 2016, and 5.5% in 2017 which resulted in a dramatic
increase in EEBP pensions from 711 CNY per month in 2004 to 2,353 CNY per month in 2015. At the same time,
the minimum level of the URRSP has remained unchanged for a long time, with the exception of an adjustment from
55 CNY per month to 70 CNY per month in 2015. Local government powers to supplement this national minimum,
according to their financial capacity, result in wide discrepancies in social pension levels. For instance, the social pen-
sion was 510 CNY per month in 2017 in Beijing—more than seven times the national minimum—and in Qinghai Prov-
ince 155 CNY per month. Due to the lack of any consistent national adjustment mechanism, pension inequality has
widened among provinces as well as between pension types, despite the outstanding achievement of coverage
extension.
Within this stratified pension system, who benefits the most? We have shown that both individual and macro cir-
cumstances influence pension levels. First of all, the pension system in China has a work‐related, performance‐related
and earning‐related structure. Those with high human capital such as high levels of education in stable jobs with high
salaries, mainly men, receive a decent pension when they retire. In contrast, women, typically with lower human cap-
ital than men in the labor market, receive lower pensions. Although the coverage of social pensions is similar between
men and women, the benefit levels are lower for women in each pension class. Furthermore, the advantageous posi-
tion of the privileged is transferred between generations. Children from families with high parental human capital have
more possibilities than others to attain high human capital themselves and, as shown, this leads to higher pensions.
Poor performance in the labor market cannot be attributed solely to individuals. From a risk society perspective, in
advanced modernity the social production of wealth is systematically accompanied by the social production of risks
(Beck, 1992). It is the obligation of the state to provide protection against such risks, derived from the assertion that
citizens possess social and economic rights that are legally defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN,
1948) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN, 1996). Inequalities within the
labor market should not be passed on to later life nor to the next generation.
Second, macro economic circumstances and social security polices created new inequalities among geographical
areas. People in advanced provinces received more and higher pensions than their counterparts in less developed
areas. Due to the interaction between human capital and macro factors, those with high human capital living in the
better‐off (eastern) provinces are the biggest winners. This unequal outcome results directly from Deng's emphasis
on local discretion in the reform process. Up to now, the pension system has been managed at the provincial level,
even though many researchers have argued that China needs a national social pension to promote equality and risk
management, which was proposed by the central government early in the 12th Five‐Year Planning Outline of Social
Security in 2012. The pension reforms in the middle and western provinces have lagged behind the eastern ones both
in terms of coverage and benefit levels. In summary, those who benefit most from China's new stratified pension
system are those from better‐off families and with high human capital living in the most economically advanced
areas. Women are at a distinct disadvantage as a result of the interaction between the labor market and the
work‐performance‐earnings‐related pension policy.
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Based on this research we argue that equality and de‐stratification should be the main goals of China's future pension
reforms once full coverage has been achieved, and that inequality could be largely overcome by integration of the dif-
ferent pension systems. Reform of the GIP in 2015 for civil servants with the same model as the EEBP and the URRSP
suggested a first step towards integration. Three further priorities need to be addressed.
First, it is urgent to merge all social pensions into one scheme, which would also promote labor force mobility and
eliminate the impact of family capital on pension inequality. Due to the prospect of a decent pension despite a low
salary, many people compete for jobs in public institutions every year.
Second, the management of pensions should shift from provincial to central government. In the context of
regional inequality, the current management of fund pooling at provincial level blocks the redistributive function
and generates new inequalities. It is important for central government to clear obstacles between provinces to provide
security for older women, the disabled, and older people living in rural areas, the middle and western regions, and the
“old revolutionary base areas” with more equal pensions. Then allowances for family/caring responsibilities and
part‐time work can be made to improve the pension status of women in the labor market.
Third, adjustments should be made to the pension model. The individual account is a fully income‐related
mechanism without any redistributive function. Thus part of social pooling should focus on redistribution, and aim
to eliminate the salary‐ and work‐related factors. Together, these reforms would represent a major step towards
the elimination of pension inequality in China and, in turn, make a substantial contribution towards the creation of
a more equal society.
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